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Critics of Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action argue that he has failed to recognize the extent to which moral argumentation is grounded in particular historical contexts, cultural traditions, collective identities, or social lifeworlds. Although he has engaged in a series of strategies aimed at acknowledging the role of particularistic considerations without abandoning his primary commitment to ethical universalism, Habermas has not succeeded in meeting all of the objections of his critics. This paper treats the contradiction between formal and substantive rationality, which lies at the heart of the debate, as an empirical phenomenon within the social world. It argues that the antinomy of formal and substantive rationality plays a central role in historical processes of social change. Through critical argumentation, social actors deliberate on contradictions among strategic, moral, and ethical standards of validity, and they struggle to resolve these contradictions through collective action and the reform of laws, policies, and institutions. Examples are drawn from US political history to substantiate the argument, and some questions are raised for further research.

In this book Joseph Heath brings Jurgen Habermas's theory of communicative action into dialogue with the most sophisticated articulation of the instrumental conception of practical rationality-modern rational choice theory. Heath begins with an overview of Habermas's action theory and his critique of decision and game theory. He then offers an alternative to Habermas's use of speech act theory to explain social order and outlines a multidimensional theory of rational action that includes norm-governed action as a specific type. In the second part of the book Heath discusses the more philosophical dimension of Habermas's conception of practical rationality. He criticizes Habermas's attempt to introduce a universalization principle governing moral discourse, as well as his criteria for distinguishing between moral and ethical problems. Heath offers an alternative account of the level of convergence exhibited by moral argumentation, drawing on game-theoretic models to specify the burden of proof that the theory of communicative action and discourse must assume.

AbstractThis article discusses arguing and communicative action as a significant tool for non-hierarchical steering modes in global governance. Arguing is based on a logic of action that differs significantly from both the rational choice-based 'logic of consequentialism', and from the 'logic of appropriateness' theorized by sociological institutionalism. Arguing constitutes a learning mechanism by which actors acquire new information, evaluate their interests in light of new empirical and moral knowledge, and – most importantly – can reflexively and collectively assess the validity claims of norms and standards of appropriate behaviour. As a result, arguing and persuasion constitute tools of 'soft steering' that might improve both the legitimacy problems of global governance by providing voice opportunities to various stakeholders and the problem-solving capacity of governance institutions through deliberation.

In The theory of communicative action, Habermas articulates an expansive critical social theory. Questions whether his project is conceptually well-founded. Focuses exclusively on the typology of action that he constructs. Argues that he displaces strategic action from the centre of theoretical attention only to replace it with an analogously privileged conception which leads him to misconstrue strategic action. In addition, argues that he fails to adequately explain the mechanism underlying communicative action. (SJK)